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REMARKS ON THE STATISTICAL ASPECTS OF THE SAFETY
ANALYSIS
LE´NA´RD PA´L1 AND MIHA´LY MAKAI2
Abstract. We investigate the statistical methods applied throughout safety
analysis of complex systems. The tolerance interval method implemented in
the widely utilized 0.95—0.95 methodology is analyzed. We point out a re-
markable weakness of the tolerance interval method concerning the principle of
repeatability. It is proved that repeating twice the procedure, the probability
that the second maximum will be larger/smaller than the first one is 50%. This
statement is not surprising, it holds for any random variable with continuous
distribution function. In order to demonstrate the undesirable consequences of
the tolerance interval method in the decision making, the results of the anal-
ysis of an elementary example are discussed. Instead of the tolerance interval
method, we suggest another method based on the sign test which has more
encouraging features, especially in the case of several output variables. The
problematic aspects of the method are also discussed. Finally, we suggest a
simple test case which is able to reveal if the tolerance interval method would
not be capable of determining the risky states of the system, when there are
only a few of them. If there are many, then the method may not explore each
one in the analysis.
1. Introduction
Regulation of industrial devices prescribes an analysis of the risk associated with
the operation of the device. The US regulation (10CFR 50.46), which is considered
as standard world wide, fixes the requirement that the analyst should conclude
”with high probability” that the device is safe. At the same time, one can add
further self-explaining requirements, like
• Repeatability: when the analysis is repeated one should get more or less the
same safety limits or other relevant safety features;
• Objectivity: the analysis should be based on scientific considerations, not
on individual considerations. This assumes that principles of safety analysis
are widely discussed and approved by experts.
• Transparency of the procedure: The safety analysis is prepared by a group
of experts, and is discussed by experts of several professions. It should
be assured that there are participants in the discussion who are capable
of providing pieces of information on every relevant and major areas of
the safety analysis (plant data, design principles, and methodology of the
analysis).
The first two items touch the safety analysis itself, whereas the third one touches
rather organizational problems. The present work deals with the first two items.
The analyst [1] may utilize the best estimate method with uncertainty analysis.
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Here a possible approach is to select a device (e.g. a nuclear reactor, chemical reac-
tor) with nominal parameters and to specify those parameters which are involved in
the uncertainty analysis. In the course of the analysis, the analyst selects a possible
realization of the device by replacing the nominal parameters by actual parameters
and calculates the parameters to be subjected to limitations. We call this procedure
a run. The actual parameters are drawn from a probability distribution determined
by engineering judgement.
We are going to point out that the traditional 0.95|0.95 tolerance interval method
fails to be repeatable and objective because the repeated code runs may lead to
considerable differences in the obtained maxima. In a considerable portion of the
cases repeating for instance twice the run, the probability that the maximum ob-
tained in the second run will be larger/smaller than in the first run is 1/2. This
statement is not at all surprising, since it holds for any random variable with con-
tinuous distribution function. The problem is that the random nature of the
maximal value is often disregarded in practice.
We point out the weakness of the 0.95|0.95 methodology by presenting a simple
example in which the ”code for simulation” is replaced by random outputs obeying
lognormal distribution, and analyze the properties of samples taken from these
outputs.
Instead of the 0.95|0.95 methodology we propose another statistical method,
called sign test, which is a variant of the good old Clopper-Pearson [2] method. We
claim that the method proposed by us has some advantages in comparison with
the tolerance interval method, furthermore the erratic behavior of the coverage
probability of the confidence interval [3] renders the method conservatism and puts
the analyst on the safe side. The main advantage of the sign test method is nothing
else than it is directly applicable in the case of several output variables.
Finally, we analyze a trivial test problem in the usual safety analysis frame:
a series of calculations are performed by a numerical model of the device. The
analysis ought to verify that no limit violation occurs in any realistic device state.
In the suggested test, limit violation occurs only in 1% of the possible states. The
challenge is to pinpoint the risky states.
The structure of the present work is as follows. In Section 2, we analyze the
random nature of the maximal values of the sample set produced by runs of a code
as it is usually done with any best estimate method. In Section 3, we present an
elementary example to point out the drawbacks of this method. The sign test is
discussed in Section 4, and in Section 5, we recommend a simple test to verify
the statistical methods to be applied in statistical inference used in safety analysis.
Conclusions are given in Section 6.
2. Features of the tolerance interval method
We are going to analyze the safety of a device. It is assumed that there is a
computer model associated with the device. The computer model is assumed to be a
best estimate model1. In the first step the major uncertain input parameters should
be identified, their probability density functions have to be determined, usually by
engineering judgement. The model provides us with output variables which are
random variables because of the random input these are subject to limitations.
1The criteria of the decision about the acceptance of a computer code as the best estimate
method are extremely important, but in the present work we do not deal with them.
3The joint probability distribution function of the output is unknown. By repeatedly
running the code, the analyst obtains a data set representing the operation of the
device which is regarded now a ”black box” device. By exploiting the information
in the data set, the analyst tries to make a decision whether the device is safe or not.
Generally accepted, that the tolerance interval method, known simply under the
name 0.95|0.95 methodology, can be used for this purposes. In former papers [4],
[5] we discussed the tolerance interval method in detail. In the present article, we
will use only a simple version of the mentioned method to demonstrate its weakness
arising because of a random parameter involved in the safety criteria. Unfortunately
most analysts neglect aftermath of that fact.
Before discussing the statistical aspects of the problem, we sum up the analyst’s
riddle. With the code at his disposal, the analyst determines the parameters under
limitation. The key question is: whether the calculated parameters exceed the
limits or not. In the analysis a major problem is that the device is not exactly
determined, the device parameters lie in an interval. This is taken into account by
selecting randomly the actual state of the device. The question is: had we repeat
the calculations with different parameters, would we have get a more risky state or
not? The resolution of the analyst problem is based on statistical considerations
and is given below.
Let y be a single random output, which is subject to limitation. Let the accep-
tance range be given as (−∞, UT ], where UT is the technological limit for y. We
assume that the distribution of y is unknown, and are looking for a quantile Qγ
such that
(2.1)
∫ Qγ
−∞
dG(y) = γ,
where G(y) is the cumulative distribution function of the output variable y. Quan-
tile Qγ is to be estimated from calculations, thus, itself is a random variable. Let
us consider the results of N runs of a code modeling the output variable y. The N
values obtained in N runs form a sample, and let us produce n + 1 samples. The
first sample y01, y02, · · · , y0N will be called basic sample. Introducing the ordered
samples
yk(1) < yk(2) < · · · < yk(N), where k = 0, 1, . . . , n,
we can write the sample elements into the following (n+ 1)×N matrix:
(2.2)
y0(1) y0(2) · · · y0(N)
y1(1) y1(2) · · · y1(N)
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
yn(1) yn(2) · · · yn(N),
in which we call the first row the ordered basic sample. Assuming that the unknown
cumulative distribution function G(y) is monotonously increasing and continuous,
it can be immediately proved the well known statement that
(2.3) P {yk(N) > G−1(γ)} = P
{∫ yk(N)
−∞
dG(y) > γ
}
= 1− γN = β,
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where G−1(γ) = Qγ is the γ-quantile of the probability distribution function G(y).
In other words, any upper sided interval [−∞, yk(N)] covers more than the γ-
quantile Qγ of the output variable y with probability β.
2
Since one finds misinterpretations in the engineering practice it is not
superfluous to underline once again the proven notion of formula (2.3).
β is the probability that the largest value yk(N) of the kth sample comprising N
output values is greater then the γ quantile of the unknown distribution G(y) of the
output variable y. Another formulation asserts that β is the probability that the
interval [−∞, yk(N)] covers a larger than γ portion of the unknown probability dis-
tribution function. The γ is often called as probability content and β as confidence
level.
The maximal values y0(N), y1(N), . . . , yn(N) are independent and identically
distributed nonnegative continuous random variables. Hence, if k 6= ℓ, where
k ≤ n and ℓ ≤ n are nonnegative integers, then the probability of the event
{yk(N) < yℓ(N)} is equal to that of the event {yk(N) > yℓ(N)}, and one obtains
immediately that
(2.4) P {yk(N) < yℓ(N)} = P {yk(N) > yℓ(N)} = 1
2
.
Introduce the notation
(2.5)
P {yk(N) < y} = P
{
max
1≤j≤N
ykj ≤ y
}
=
N∏
j=1
P {ykj ≤ y} = [G(y)]N = H(y),
k = 0, 1, . . . , n,
one can write that
P {yk(N) < yℓ(N)} =
∫ +∞
−∞
[1−H(y)] dH(y) = 1
2
and similarly
P {yk(N) > yℓ(N)} =
∫ +∞
−∞
H(y) dH(y) =
1
2
.
From the equation (2.4), the trivial statement follows that the probability of finding
the maximal value in a sample larger/smaller than in the previous one, is 1/2.
Let 0 ≤ νn(y) ≤ n denote the number of those random variables from among
y1(N), . . . , yn(N)
which are greater than y. Obviously,
(2.6) P {νn(y) = ℓ} = J (n)ℓ (y) =
(
n
ℓ
)
[1−H(y)]ℓ [H(y)](n−ℓ) .
Let p
(n)
ℓ stand for the probability that from among the random variables y1(N), . . . , yn(N)
exactly ℓ ≤ n is greater than y0(N), which may be any real number. We obtain
2It is worth mentioning that the probability of covering more than the γ-quantile of the dis-
tribution function G(y) by any upper sided interval [−∞, yk(N − s)] is given by the equation
β = I1−γ(N − s+ 1, s),
where I1−γ(N − s+ 1, s) is the cumulative beta-distribution function.
5from (2.6) that
(2.7) p
(n)
ℓ =
∫ +∞
−∞
J
(n)
ℓ (y dH(y) =
(
n
ℓ
) ∫ 1
0
(1− u)ℓ un−ℓ du = 1
n+ 1
.
Note, that the probability p
(n)
ℓ is independent of ℓ.
3 The probability P
(n)
k , that at
least k ≤ n out of maximal values y1(N), y2(N), . . . , yn(N) will exceed the basic
maximal value y0(N), can be calculated by using the formula (2.7). We have that
(2.8) P
(n)
k =
n∑
ℓ=k
p
(n)
ℓ =
n+ 1− k
n+ 1
= 1− k
n+ 1
,
which is independent of γ and β. In the sequel the larger/smaller statements will
be used only in their ”larger” interpretation.
Let λ be the number of those y1(N), y2(N), . . . , yn(N) variables which are larger
than the basic y0(N). Clearly, λ is a random variable, its expectation value is
(2.9) E{λ} =
n∑
ℓ=1
ℓ p
(n)
ℓ =
n
2
,
and its variance is
D2{λ} =
n∑
ℓ=1
(ℓ − n/2)2 pℓ = 1
6
(
1 +
n
2
)
.
As a consequence, we see that the expectation of the number of maximal values
out of n samples, that will exceed the basic maximal value y0(N), is 50% of n, i.e.
repeating the run many times we may expect maximal values higher than the basic
maximal value in every second case.
In the light of this statement one asks: is this the intended outcome of the
0.95|0.95 methodology? A further serious objection to the 0.95|0.95 methodology
is the absence of the uniqueness. In Fig. 1 on can see the dependence of the
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Figure 1. Dependence of the confidence level β on the probability content
γ for sample size N = 59.
3This statement is valid for any random variable of continuous distribution.
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confidence level β on the probability content γ for sample size N = 59. The
statement that the maximal element in a sample obtained by N = 59 runs is higher
than the unknown quantile Q0.95 with probability 0.95 is equivalent, for instance,
to the statement that the maximal element is higher than the unknown quantile
Q0.98 but with probability 0.7. It is clear that there are infinite many β|γ pairs
corresponding to the same N value. In the safety analysis the 0.95|0.95 pair is
accepted but not mentioned that other pairs are also allowed.
3. A witness of the weakness
In order to demonstrate the weakness of the tolerance interval method
, we consider a rather simple example. Take a single output variable y of lognormal
distribution 4 with parametersm and d. This plays the role of our ”unknown” G(y)
distribution. The density function is
(3.1) g(y) =
1
yd
√
2π
exp
[
−1
2
(
log y −m
d
)2]
,
where y ≥ 0.
We carried out the following numerical experiment. By means of Monte Carlo
simulation we generated samples of size N = 59. In the simulation we have taken
m = 2.5 and d = 0.5. As mentioned before, we call the first sample generated by
N = 59 runs the basic sample, the maximal element of which is denoted by y0(59).
Then, we repeat the sample generation n = 1000 times, and select the maximal
value out of each sample. We obtained a series
y1(59), . . . , y1000(59)
of the upper limits of the one-sided tolerance intervals which cover the 95% of the
distribution with probability β = 0.95.
The maximal values of samples are shown in Fig. 2. The maximum in the basic
sample is y0(59) ≈ 45. The lowest of the maximal values in the experiment is 22.04,
while the largest is 132.27. One can observe that in 234 cases (more than 23% of
the one thousand samples) the maximum exceeds y0(59) ≈ 45.
In order to visualize better the random behavior of the maxima, we condensed
the maxima, and counted the frequency of maxima falling into [(i− 1) ∗ 5, i ∗ 5], i =
1, . . . 200. That empirical distribution is shown in Fig. 3. Fig. 4 shows the difference
yk(59)− y0(59).
Let us check now if these properties are comply with the statistics. The proba-
bility that the largest element in a given sample is greater than Qγ is 1− γN . Let
ξn(Qγ) stand for the random variable giving the number of maximum elements ex-
ceeding Qγ . The probability distribution of the newly introduced random variable
is
(3.2) P{ξn(Qγ) = k} =
(
n
k
)
(1− γN)k γN(n−k).
From this expression we obtain the expectation value and the variance as
(3.3) E{ξn(Qγ)} = n(1− γN ),
4The type of the distribution function does not have any substantial influence on the
considerations.
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Figure 2. Maximal values of 1000 samples of size N = 59. The maximal
value of the basic sample is y0(59) ≈ 45 and denoted by red line.
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Figure 3. Distribution of the maximal values of 1000 samples of size N =
59 in intervals of length 5.
(3.4) D2{ξn(Qγ)} = n γN (1− γN ).
When n and k are sufficiently large, the distribution of the random variable
(3.5) χn(Qγ) =
ξn(Qγ)−E{ξn(Qγ)}
D{ξn(Qγ)}
is approximately standard normal, hence,
(3.6) E{ξn(Qγ)} − κ D{ξn(Qγ)} ≤ ξn(Qγ) ≤ E{ξn(Qγ)} + κ D{ξn(Qγ)}
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Figure 4. Distribution of the deviations of the maximal values from the
basic maximum 45 in intervals of length 2.5.
is valid with probability w, and κ is the root of the equation
(3.7)
1√
2π
∫ κ
−∞
e−u
2/2 du =
1 + w
2
.
Substituting here n = 1000, N = 59, γ = 0.95 and w = 0.95, we get E{ξn(Qγ)} ≈
952, D{ξn(Qγ)} ≈ 6.79, and κ ≈ 1.96. The inequality (3.6) is given by
938 < ξ1000(Q0.95) < 964,
where ξ1000(Q0.95) ≈ 940. This relationship is witnessing the correctness of the
statistics. In spite of the nice agreement we wish to underline that the 0.95|0.95
methodology does not exclude rare events such as limit violation when some of the
calculated values are over the technological limit UT .
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Figure 5. Relative frequency of the event yℓ−1(59) < yℓ(59) in
50, 100, . . . , 1000 neighbors.
9To illustrate that the probability of finding a larger maximal value in a sample
than in the previous one, is wnb = 0.5, we have used the maximums in 1000 samples
of size 59 and have calculated the relative frequencies of the event yℓ−1(59) < yℓ(59)
in 50(50)1000 neighbors. The results of calculations are seen in Fig. 5.
One should emphasize that this behavior of the upper limit of the tolerance in-
terval is not surprising, this is a well established consequence of the random
nature of the maximal values selected from the samples. It seems to be
justified the need that the tolerance interval method has to be replaced by a more
reliable method, if it is possible at all.
4. Method based on sign test
The concluding remarks at the end of the previous section are not optimistic.
The question whether one can find a suitable check, which is based on a computer
model, on the safety of a large device cannot be answered satisfactorily. Below we
propose a method, borrowed from Kendall’s book [6], called ”sign test” which may
be more adequate than the 0.95/0.95 method.
4.1. Single output variable. Again, we assume the cumulative distribution func-
tionG(y) of the output variable to be continuous but unknown. Let SN = {y1, . . . , yN}
be a sample of N observations (runs of a computer model). Define the function
(4.1) ∆(x) =


1, if x > 0,
0, if x < 0,
and introduce the statistical function
(4.2) zN =
N∑
k=1
∆(UT − yk)
which gives the number of sample elements smaller than the safety level UT by
declaring that any state of the device with output smaller than UT is safe. Criteria
based on statistical function (4.2) are called sign criterion since zN counts only the
positive UT−yk differences. When G(y) is continuous, the probability of UT−y = 0
is surly zero.
Obviously, distribution of zN is binomial, using the notation
(4.3) P{∆(UT − y) = 1} = P{y ≤ UT } = p,
we obtain
(4.4) P{zN = k} =
(
N
k
)
pk (1− p)N−k, k = 0, 1, . . . , N.
The decisive parameter is the probability p which can be called safety probability,
and our task is to find a confidence interval [γL(k), γU (k)] that covers the value
p with a prescribed probability β provided we have a sample of size N and in the
sample zN = k ≤ N elements smaller than the safety level UT . The mathematics
of the problem is well known, and one can find a large number of publications [7]
- [11] in this field. However, there are several special aspects of the safety analysis,
which need some further considerations.
Clearly, the formula (4.3) gives the probability that the output y is not larger
than the safety level UT . When the lower limit γL(k) of the confidence interval is
close to unity, we can claim at least with probability β that the chance of finding the
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output y smaller than UT is also close to unity and the device under consideration,
in its output y, can be regarded as safe at the level [β|γL(k)].
If the sample size N > 50, the random variable
(4.5)
k −Np√
Np (1− p) = ζk
has approximately normal distribution. Here k is the number of sample elements
not exceeding UT . Let β denote the confidence level, then
P{|ζk| ≤ uβ} = 2Φ(uβ)− 1 = β,
where Φ(x) is the standard normal distribution function. This equation can be
rewritten in the form
P{|ζk| ≤ uβ} = P{(N + u2β)(p− γL)(p− γU ) ≤ 0} = β,
where
γL = γL(k, uβ) =
(4.6) =
1
N + u2β
[
k +
1
2
u2β − uβ
√
k(1− k/N) + u2β/4
]
,
and
γU = γU (k, uβ) =
(4.7) =
1
N + u2β
[
k +
1
2
u2β + uβ
√
k(1− k/N) + u2β/4
]
.
Here uβ is the root of
Φ(uβ) =
1
2
(1 + β).
In a number of cases it suffices to know the probability of the event {γL(k, vβ) ≤
p}, where vβ = Φ−1(β). Since ζk with fixed k is a decreasing function of p, the
events {ζk ≤ vβ} and {γL(k, vβ) ≤ p} are equivalent, hence
P{ζk ≤ vβ} = P{γL(k, vβ) ≤ p} = Φ(vβ) = β.
Consequently, the operation of a device can be regarded safe if the parameter p
for all output variables is covered by [γL(k, vβ), 1] with a prescribed probability β,
provided that γL(k, vβ) is close to unity.
Table 1. Number of successes k in a sample of size N
k 99 108 118 128 137 147 157 166 176 185 195
N 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200
Table 1 gives the number of successes k in a sample of size N needed for acceptance
at the level β = γL = 0.95. We utilized the approximate formula (4.6) with
uβ → v0.95 ≈ 1.64 to derive the entries in Table 1.
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Figure 6. Dependence of γL and γU on the number of successes in a sample
of N=100 elements.
When the sample size is less than 50, we may not apply the asymptotically valid
normal distribution. The below given derivation of the confidence limits is a mod-
ified version of the method proposed by Clopper and Pearson [2]. The probability
of at least k successes from N observations is given by
S
(N)
k (p) =
k∑
j=0
(
N
j
)
pj (1− p)N−j ,
where p = P{y ≤ UT }. This formula can be recast as
S
(N)
k (p) =
N !
k! (N − k − 1)!
∫ 1−p
0
(1− v)k vN−k−1 dv,
and it is clear from that expression that S
(N)
k (p) is a monotonously decreasing
function of p. Since
S
(N)
k (p) =


1, if p = 0,
0, if p = 1,
it assumes an arbitrary value only once in the interval [0,1]. Consequently, a p = pδ
value exists so that
S
(N)
k (pδ) = δ, ∀ 0 < δ < 1.
Exploiting the monotony, we can construct a function such that
R
(N)
k (p) < R
(N)
k (pδ) = δ,
when p > pδ. Such a function is
R
(N)
k (p) = 1− S(N)k−1(p) =
N∑
j=k
(
N
j
)
pj (1 − p)N−j,
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Finally, we establish the upper limit γU from
(4.8) S
(N)
k (γU ) ≤
1
2
(1− β),
and the lower limit γL from
(4.9) R
(N)
k (γL) ≤
1
2
(1− β).
The interval [γL, γU ] covers the unknown parameter p with probability β. The
dependence of γL and γU are shown in Fig. 6 for a sample of N = 100 elements, β
stands for confidence level.
4.2. Several Output Variables. Now we assume the output to comprise ℓ vari-
ables. Let these variables be y1, . . . , yℓ. There are several fairly good test to prove
if they are statistically independent or not. To each of the independent variables
we can apply the considerations above but for dependent variables we need novel
approach. Let
SN =


y11 y12 . . . y1N
y21 y22 . . . y2N
...
...
. . .
...
yℓ1 yℓ2 . . . yℓN


denote the sample matrix obtained in N >> ℓ independent observations. With a
computer model, an observation is a run. Introducing the column vector ~yk of ℓ
components, the sample matrix can be written as
SN = (~y1, . . . , ~yN ) .
In accordance with our assumption, different vectors ~yk are statistically independent
but the components in a given vector may be dependent.
Below we expound the sign test only for two output variables y1 and y2 relying
on the assumption that their joint distribution function G(y1,y2) is unknown but
continuous in either variable. The goal of the foregoing analysis is to verify the
safety conditions y1 < U
(1)
T and y2 < U
(2)
T . When the conditions are accomplished
with probability p12 = G(U
(1)
T , U
(2)
T ) ≈ 1 we say the device is safe for the outputs y1
and y2. Here, as before, the limits U
(1)
T , and U
(2)
T are determined by technological
requirements. Since p12 is unknown, our job is to construct a confidence interval
[γ
(1,2)
L , γ
(1,2)
U ] so that it covers p12 with probability β12. In most cases it suffices to
calculate solely the lower confidence limit γ
(1,2)
L , and to use the interval [γ
(1,2)
L , 1]
as confidence interval.
The event {y1k < U (1)T , y2k < U (2)T } will be called a success. Now, introduce the
statistical function
z
(1,2)
N =
N∑
k=1
∆(U
(1)
T − y1k) ∆(U (2)T − y2k)
which gives the number of successes in a sample of size N . Obviously, if y1k < U
(1)
T
and y2k < U
(2)
T , then
∆(U
(1)
T − y1k) ∆(U (2)T − y2k) = 1,
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while 0 otherwise. Since the newly introduced random variable z
(1,2)
N is the sum of
N independent random variables, assuming values either 1 or 0, its distribution is
binomial. Using the notation
P{∆(U (1)T − y1) ∆(U (2)T − y2) = 1} = P{y1 < U (1)T , y2 < U (2)T } = p12,
we can write
P{z(1,2)N = k} =
(
N
k
)
pk12 (1 − p12)N−k,
for k = 0, 1, . . . , N . Clearly, p12 is the joint probability of safety for the output
variables y1 and y2.
At this point we rejoin the thought of line of the previous subsection. Instead
of repeating the already familiar argumentation, we amend two trivial although
important remarks. Let us define the following two statistical functions:
z
(1)
N =
N∑
i=1
∆(U
(1)
T − y1i) and z(2)N =
N∑
j=1
∆(U
(2)
T − y2j).
In general, these two functions are statistically not independent. Each of them is
a sum of N independent random variables with values 1 or 0, therefore, one can
write
P{z(1)N = i} =
(
N
i
)
pi1(1− p1)N−i
and
P{z(2)N = j} =
(
N
j
)
pj2(1− p2)N−j ,
i, j = 1, . . . , N,
where
pℓ = P{yℓ < U (ℓ)T } = P{∆(U (ℓ)T − yℓ) = 1}, ℓ = 1, 2,
are unknown probabilities of safety for output variables p1 and p2. Applying the
method used previously, this time separately to the samples
S(1)N = {y1i, i = 1, . . . , N} and S(2)N = {y2j, j = 1, . . . , N},
we construct two random intervals [γ
(1)
L , 1] and [γ
(2)
L , 1] covering p1 and p2 with
probabilities β1 and β2, respectively. Evidently, it could occur that the levels
(β1|γ(1)L ) and (β2|γ(2)L ) corroborate the claim that samples S(1)N and S(2)N separately
comply with safety requirements. However, this does not mean that we would ar-
rive at the same conclusion from analyzing the two samples jointly. The reason
is that y1 and y2, the two output random variables are statistically in general not
independent. Hence, we should ascertain weather the interval [γ
(1,2)
L , 1] covers the
probability p12 with the pre-assigned probability β12.
Decision on the safety, when two output variables are subjected to limitations
should go as follows. Firstly, we test the hypothesis concerning dependence of
the output variables y1 and y2. If they are dependent, we should estimate the
random interval [γ
(1,2)
L , 1] which covers p12 with probability β12. Solely if they
are statistically independent should we estimate the random intervals [γ
(1)
L , 1] and
[γ
(2)
L , 1] covering p1 and p2 with probabilities β1 and β2, respectively.
For the sake of demonstration, an example is given below. First, the lower
confidence limits are calculated for the parameter p as a function of the success
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number k, in the case of sample size N = 100, at the confidence levels β = 0.9, 0.95
and 0.99.
Table 2. Lower confidence limits in a sample of N = 100 as a function of
the success number k at three confidence levels β
k \ β 0.90 0.95 0.99
90 0.8501 0.8362 0.8086
91 0.8616 0.8482 0.8212
92 0.8733 0.8602 0.8340
93 0.8850 0.8725 0.8471
94 0.8970 0.8850 0.8604
95 0.9092 0.8977 0.8741
96 0.9216 0.9108 0.8882
97 0.9344 0.9242 0.9030
98 0.9476 0.9383 0.9185
99 0.9616 0.9534 0.9354
100 0.9772 0.9704 0.9549
Then, by using Monte Carlo simulation, we have generated two samples a) and
b) either sample contains N = 100 observations (runs) of two output variables. The
samples have been generated from a bivariate normal distribution with parameters
m1 = m2 = 0 and σ1 = σ2 = 1 but the correlation coefficient is C = 0.1 in the
sample a) while that is C = 0.7 in the sample b). The acceptance range is [−2, 2]
for both output variables. In sample a) and b) 4 and 2 samples lie respectively
outside the acceptance range.
First let us consider the sample a). It can be seen that the number of successes
among 100 events is 96, i.e. the number of safety violation is 4. From Table
2 one can read in this case that the interval [0.9108,1] covers the parameter p12
with probability β12 = 0.95. This coverage is rather small to state the device is
safe. When we assess the output variables one by one, we see that the associated
parameters p1 and p2 are covered by the interval [0.9383, 1] with probability β =
0.95 in either sample. However tempting is to accept 0.9383 as lower bound for the
probability to be used in safety analysis, that number has nothing to do with p12
and should not be used in safety analysis.
Now let us pass on to sample b) where we see a strong correlation between y1
and y2. The number of safety violations is 2 and from Table 2 one can read that the
confidence interval [0.9383, 1] covers the parameter p12 with probability β12 = 0.95.
In other words, we conclude that the probability of the event {y1 < U (1)T , y2 < U (2)T }
is at least 0.9383. Since there is only 1 violation for both output variables y1 and
y2, according to Table 2 the parameters p1 and p2 are covered by the same interval
[0.9534, 1] on the level β1 = β2 = 0.95. Again, however favorable these numbers are,
they should not be used in assessing safety. The above discussed simple numerical
example clearly indicated the danger awaiting the analyst when his/her judgment
is based on tests performed separately on correlated output variables.
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Finally, we mention that the generalization of the sign test to ℓ > 2 output
variables is straightforward, we have to use the statistical function
(4.10) z
(1,...,ℓ)
N =
N∑
k=1
ℓ∏
j=1
∆(U
(j)
T − yjk)
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to evaluate safety based on observation of N samples of the ℓ output variables. In
this manner we obtain the sum of N independent random variables in expression
(4.10), and then, the further steps will be the same as at the beginning of the
subsection.
4.3. Criticism of the sign test method. It is evident that the sign test method is
based on the interval estimation of the binomial proportion. Therefore, all difficul-
ties connected with the erratic behavior of the coverage probability of the confidence
interval are appearing in the sign test method, too.
Let N be the number of runs and k is the number of events {y < UT }, i.e. the
number of successes. Denote by Dα(N, k) the set of points of the confidence interval
[γL(N, k, α), γU (N, k, α)],
where α = 1 − β and β is the nominal coverage probability, i.e. the coincidence
level. Introduce the indicator function
(4.11) Iα(N, k, p) =


1, if p ∈ Dα(N, k),
0, if p 6∈ Dα(N, k)
and define the coverage probability by the relationship
(4.12)
Cα(N, p) =
N∑
k=0
Iα(N, k, p)P {zN = k} =
N∑
k=0
Iα(N, k, p)
(
N
k
)
pk (1 − p)N−k,
which, as we will see, is different from the nominal coverage probability β.
In order to characterize the quality of the coverage it is often used the mean
coverage probability
(4.13) 〈Cα(N, p)〉 =
∫ 1
0
Cα(N, p) dp,
and the mean length of the confidence interval
(4.14) Lα =
N∑
k=0
[γU (N, k, α) − γL(N, k, α)]
(
N
k
)
pk (1− p)N−k.
In the case of the Clopper-Pearson interval, which we introduced by (4.8) and (4.9),
the actual coverage probability is always equal to or above the confidence level β.
In the practice, it is often used the one-sided confidence interval {γL(N, k, α), 1},
since the usual question is wether the γL(N, k, α) value is large enough for the safety
parameter p at a prescribed confidence level 1 − α = β. It can be shown that the
root p = pL of the equation
(4.15) Ip(k,N − k + 1) = α
is the lower confidence limit, i.e. pL = γL(N, k, α). Here, Ip(k,N − k + 1) is the
cumulative beta-distribution function. From Table 3 one can see that at least 99
successes out of 100 are needed to state the safety parameter p is higher than 0.95
with probability 0.95. In order to demonstrate the erratic behavior of the coverage
probability of the confidence interval {γL(N, k, α), 1}, we calculated the sum
C0.05(100, p) =
100∑
k=0
I0.05(100, k, p)
(
100
k
)
pk (1− p)100−k,
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Table 3. Dependence of the lower confidence limit γL(N, k, α) on the
number of successes k at the sample size N = 100 and the significance
level α = 0.05
k 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
γL 0.8363 0.8482 0.8603 0.8725 0.8850 0.8977 0.9108 0.9243 0.9384 0.9534 0.9705
where now I0.05(100, k, p) is defined on the points of the interval {γL(100, k, 0.05), 1}.
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Figure 9. Dependence of the coverage probability on the safety parameter
at the sample size N = 100 and at the nominal confidence level β = 0.95)
In Fig. 9 one can see that for any fixed p the actual coverage probability can
be much larger than β = 1 − α. It means that the Clopper-Pearson interval is
very conservative and is not a good choice for practical use, unless the prescription
Cα(n, p) ≥ β is demanded. As known, there are many other intervals [3] for the
estimation of p, however, the erratic behavior of the coverage probability cannot
be ceased.
By using the formula (4.14) one can plot the dependence of the mean length
of confidence interval on the safety parameter p. In Fig. 10 it can be seen this
dependence in the case of the sample size N = 100 and the confidence level β =
0.95, respectively. It is interesting to note, that the mean lower confidence limit
〈γL(100, k, 0.05)〉 ≈ 1− 0.1014 = 0.8986 corresponds nearly to the success number
k = 95.
5. Simple considerations
The safety analysis of an industrial device consists of the following steps. The
designer determines the nominal state of the device, and enlists the parameters
influencing the state of the device. We call those parameters input. Either the
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designer or the analyst determines the probability distribution of the input, usually
by engineering judgment. The analyst selects a code to carry out simulation of
the device operation, and runs the code with a given number of random (or other
reasonably chosen) inputs. Therefore, the output variables should have a random
part, and the analyst tries to evaluate these uncertainties, by using for instance the
tolerance interval method. In order to illustrate some problems of the statistical
approach to be applied in safety analysis, below we define an over simplified device.
Assume that the device is represented by 50 × 50 = 2500 cells each of which
corresponds to a possible state of the device. Each state is determined by a fixed
real number 0 ≤ R ≤ 1 which is identified as a scaled risk of the state. According to
this, every cell is characterized by a risk value. The operation of the device consists
of a random selection of one cell the R value of which defines the output variable y.
The run of the ”code” corresponding to the best estimate method in this gedanken
experiment means the realization of this operation. Repeating the run N -times, we
obtain a sample with N elements.5
If R = 0, then the state is safe, there is no limit violation. We suggest to
investigate a device where the limit violation may occur only in a small fraction of
the states, actually in 1% of the states. To simplify the presentation, the R values
are given in Figure 11.
Most of the cells has no limit violation (light cells). Limit violation is observed
only at a few cells (25 of them, 1 % of the states): 12 cells have minor limit violations
(R ≤ 0.1), their partition: R = 0.08 in 4 cells, R = 0.09 in 4 cells, R = 0.1 in 4 cells.
Further 10 cells have moderate limit violation (0.1 ≤ R ≤ 0.2). Their partition is
R = 0.15 in 4 cells, R = 0.2 in 6 cells, and 3 have severe limit violations (> 0.25),
their partition is R = 0.3 in 2 cells, and R = 0.5 in 1 cell. All the cells with limit
violation are in the center of the region shown in Fig. 11, see the enlargement in
Fig. 12.
5It is important to note that this sample belongs to the family of discrete distribution samples.
However, it can be shown that the Wilk’s formula can be applied also in this case provided that
the number of discontinuities of the unknown cumulative distribution function is finite.
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Figure 10. Dependence of the mean length of CI on the safety parameter
at the sample size N = 100 and at the nominal confidence level β = 0.95)
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The 0.95|0.95 methodology is performed in the following way: one generates
N = 59 random integers from the set of uniformly distributed integers 1, 2, . . . , 2500,
and then reads the risk values R of the generated 59 cells. 6 These risk values form
the basic sample. The maximal element R1(59) of the sample defines the random
6During the calculations the random number generator should be reseeded.
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interval [0, R1(59)] which covers the 95 % of the risk distribution with probability
β = 0.95. Let us repeat this procedure n = 100 times, and determine the numbers
of occurrences of the risk values 0, 0.08, 0.09, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5. In order to see
the effect of the strengthening requirements, we performed the same calculations
in the cases of N = 90 and N = 459, which sample sizes correspond to the levels
0.95|0.99 and the 0.99|0.99, respectively.
Table 4. Maximum values of R in n = 100 calculations with
sample sizes N = 59, 90, 458 in each calculation.
Number in 100 cases with
R N = 59 N = 90 N = 458
0.50 5 2 27
0.30 2 7 17
0.20 15 16 33
0.15 4 13 12
0.10 7 4 7
0.09 4 7 2
0.08 8 6 1
0.00 55 45 1
Actual results are given in Table 4. If N = 59, then in 55% of the cases, we
conclude (falsely) that the system is safe, and only in 7% of the samples we get an
alarming large, R > 0.2 value, from which the correct maximum is obtained in 5%
of the cases. If N = 90, then we see some moderate improvement: solely 45% of
the cases show no limit violation and 9% indicate alarming limit violation. With
N = 458, only 1% of the cases show the system to be safe and 44% of the cases
indicate alarmingly high limit violation.
We admit that the presented gedanken experiment is a real challenge since only
one state out of 100 has appreciable limit violation, but perhaps in a real safety
analysis we encounter possible device states which are safe in general except for a
small fraction of the possible states. Safety analysis is done to reveal such situa-
tions. The above given considerations may give us an impression what the ”high
probability” might be in 10CFR 50.46.
The reader may think that this is an exceptional case. However, it is fairly
common that only a small fraction of the reasonable inputs may lead to safety
hazard. Another problem is, that if we have a large number of unsafe cells, in
the average, one out of 20 will remain uncovered, this is the meaning of the 95%
confidence level.
6. Concluding remarks
In the validation and verification process of a code one carries out a series of
computations. The input data are not precisely determined because measured data
have an error, calculated data are often obtained from a more or less accurate
model. Some users of large codes are content with comparing the nominal output
obtained from the nominal input, whereas all the possible inputs should be
taken into account when judging safety. At the same time, any statement
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concerning safety must be aleatory, and its merit can be judged only when the
probability is known with which the statement is true.
There are several statistical tools applicable in safety analysis. Before choosing
the appropriate statistical method, one has to look at the physical model. If we
assume a situation where most of the possible states are safe and our task is to
pinpoint the low number of possible dangerous states, we need a larger statis-
tical sample, i.e. we have to carry out a larger number of calculations with the
computer model.
On the other hand, if there are many risky states, the tolerance interval may
not reveal all of them, there is a good chance that every 20th risky cell remains
undetected when the tolerance level is 0.95.
The authors arrived at conclusion that the random character of the com-
puted output values is usually neglected by the analysts. For instance, the
trivial fact that the maximal value of an output variable obtained by the tolerance
interval method is not repeatable, since it is a random variable, is almost forgotten
in the applied uncertainty analysis. It may happen that the authority will carry
out an independent safety analysis which may lead to a smaller safety reserve in
50% of the cases and the analyst may find himself/herself in an inconvenient situ-
ation. When the output variables are correlated, then the separate analysis of the
variables may result incorrect statements.
Consequent application of order statistics or the application of the sign test may
offer a way out of the present situation. The authors are also convinced that efforts
should be made
• to study the statistics of the output variables,
• to study the occurrence of large fluctuations in the analyzed cases
• to avoid random quantities acquiring essential role in safety analysis.
All these observations should influence, in safety analysis, the application of
best estimate methods, and underline the opinion that any realistic modeling and
simulation of complex systems must include the probabilistic features of the system
and the environment.
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